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The First Amendment and the Politics of
Reproductive Health Care
B. Jessie Hill
More than forty years after Roe v. Wade1 and more than fifty years
after Griswold v. Connecticut,2 nearly every aspect of reproductive
rights remains intensely disputed. The courts continue to struggle
with the scope of the constitutional right to abortion.3 Employers seek
exemptions from generally applicable requirements to provide
insurance coverage for contraception, re-opening questions about
women’s need for contraception that once seemed well settled.4
Indeed, the very nature of abortion and contraception is contested:
some consider them to be essential health care, whereas others
consider them controversial moral choices. Moreover, these two
different ways of looking at reproductive health care operate not only
in the social political realms but also often, in unacknowledged ways,
in the judicial realm.
This Article examines these hidden assumptions about the place of
reproductive health care—especially contraception and abortion—
within health care more generally. Abortion and contraception are
often perceived by courts and legislators as being something other
than health care. Moreover, reproductive health is doctrinally, and
 Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Liz Sepper for inviting me to contribute
to this symposium.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. As of this writing, the Supreme Court is preparing to revisit the meaning of the “undue
burden” standard for abortion restrictions in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th
Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt __ S. Ct. __, 2015
WL 517636 (Nov. 13, 2015).
4. This Term, the Supreme Court will revisit the scope of the right of employees of
religious organizations to access subsidized contraception in Geneva College v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), and the related cases that were
consolidated with it. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 144 (Nov. 6, 2015).
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often even physically or geographically, isolated from health care
more generally—for example, abortions generally take place in
freestanding clinics rather than hospitals or doctors’ offices.5
Arguably, this isolation has encouraged, if not enabled, differential
regulation of reproductive health care,6 for example in the form of socalled TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws.7
These include laws that require clinics offering abortions to meet
certain standards—such as having physicians on staff who hold
admitting privileges at a local hospital—that are not applicable to
other medical procedures of similar risk level.8
If reproductive health care is not exactly health care, then what is
it? In the views of some courts and commentators, abortion and
contraception are not forms health care, but instead political, moral,
or ideological choices. Of course, suggesting that abortion and
contraception possess moral dimensions will not strike most people
as outrageous or surprising. Indeed, many health care decisions have
moral and political dimensions. But in many cases, the moral
dimension of reproductive health care leads courts to construct it as
primarily, or even exclusively, a moral (or political or ideological)
choice and to obscure the private, medical dimensions altogether.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) could counteract this view
somewhat. For the first time, contraception was identified as an
“essential health benefit.”9 Indeed, it is significant that the ACA
5. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical
Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 837–40 (1999) (describing how most abortions came to be
provided in free-standing clinics).
6. Id. at 839 (arguing that, by “concentrat[ing] abortion services in the free-standing
clinics and in the hands of what quickly became a very small number of abortion providers,”
pro-choice groups were telling “organized medicine, which had become an important
participant in abortion liberalization efforts, [that it] no longer had to hold itself responsible for
helping to provide actual abortion services”).
7. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1849, 1849–50 (2015) (defining “TRAP” laws).
8. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (adjudicating
a constitutional challenge to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West. Supp.
2014), which requires that abortion providers, but not other physicians, possess hospital
admitting privileges); Ushma Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency Department Visits and
Complications After Abortion, 125 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 175 (2015) (finding that the
complication rate for abortion is extremely low).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012). Although the
ACA requires provision of essential health benefits, and essential health benefits must include

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/5

2016] The First Amendment and Reproductive Health Care

105

affirms that contraception is not just health care, but it is actually
essential health care. It is thus possible to see the Affordable Care
Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate as an initial attempt to break
down the distinction between reproductive health care and the rest of
health care. Put another way, the ACA may be breaking down the
distinction between “therapeutic” health care—that which is designed
to meet important medical needs—and “elective” health care such as
contraception and abortion, which may be seen as the product of a
moral choice.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. First, Part I
demonstrates how reproductive health care has been treated as
second-class health care. In large part, the view of abortion and
contraception as less-than-essential health care has been created and
reinforced by the longstanding distinction between “elective” and
“therapeutic” reproductive health care services. Part II then turns to
the First Amendment. Drawing on recent controversies at the
intersection of reproductive rights and First Amendment rights, this
Part analyzes how the tendency to view reproductive health care as
something other than “real” or “essential” health care has played out
when courts are tasked with categorizing reproductive health-related
speech for First Amendment purposes. Specifically, it demonstrates
the schism that arises in the case law between judges that view
reproductive health care as primarily medical and those that view it
as something else—an elective procedure and thus a moral, political,
or ideological choice. Finally, this Article concludes in Part III with
an attempt to sketch a defense of the view that reproductive health
care is essential, necessary, and therapeutic rather than merely the
elective product of a moral choice.
I. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE: “THERAPEUTIC” OR “ELECTIVE”?
The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic abortion
and contraception has permeated case law and popular discourse for
preventive services for women, the statute itself does not specify that contraception constitutes
such a service. Instead, that requirement is found in the implementing regulations. See 42
U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (referencing guidelines promulgated by Health Resources and
Services Administration, available at http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/).
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decades. The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
health care is thus important not only for its direct legal effect—that
is, because some legal rules draw distinctions between therapeutic
and elective interventions—but also because it shapes the way
politicians, individuals, and voters think about reproductive health
care, often on an unconscious level. This Part thus presents a handful
of examples of how the therapeutic/elective distinction has been
identified and remains entrenched in American legal and political
discourse.
The Hyde Amendment, passed for the first time in 1976 and again
every year thereafter, is an appropriations rider that forbids the use of
federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions except in certain narrow
circumstances.10 The scope of the restriction on federal funds has
varied over time—sometimes permitting federal payment for
abortions only to save the life of the woman or if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest, and at other points including the “health”
of the woman as a permissible indication—but the focus on funding
only “therapeutic” abortions remained throughout.11 Indeed, the terms
“therapeutic” and “elective” permeate the debates over the Hyde
Amendment, particularly in its early years.12 More recently enacted
state statutes, as well, draw distinctions between therapeutic and nontherapeutic abortion, often defining “therapeutic” quite narrowly.13
10. Pub. L. No. 94–439, § 209, 90 Stat 1418 (1976) (first Hyde Amendment, enacted
September 30, 1976); see generally Jon F. Merz et al., A Review of Abortion Policy: Legality,
Medicaid Funding, and Parental Involvement, 1967–1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 7–8 &
n.44 (1995). In addition, the ACA and an executive order issued by President Barack Obama
now reinforce the restrictions contained in the Hyde Amendment. Exec. Order No. 13,535 § 1,
75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18023(b)(1)(B) (West 2010).
11. Merz, supra note 10, at n.44.
12. See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. 34828, 34829 (1976) (contrasting therapeutic and elective
abortions for funding purposes).
13. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (West 2010) (forbidding abortions after
twenty weeks unless the woman “has a condition which so complicates her medical condition
as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of
substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 9.04 (West 2011) (defining nontherapeutic abortion as “an abortion that is performed or
induced when the life of the mother would not be endangered if the fetus were carried to term
or when the pregnancy of the mother was not the result of rape or incest reported to a law
enforcement agency”).
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Tracing the distinction back yet further, Professor Melissa Murray
has written about the history of birth control litigation.14 Before
Griswold v. Connecticut, Murray notes, there were two federal
challenges to Connecticut’s criminal ban on contraceptives that made
it to the U.S. Supreme Court.15 One was the well-known case of Poe
v. Ullman, in which the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the
Connecticut birth control ban because of its supposed history of nonenforcement.16 The other was Trubek v. Ullman, which the Supreme
Court dismissed without opinion on the same day as Poe, likely for
the same reason.17 As Murray points out, Poe involved two
traditional married couples, with breadwinner husbands and stay-athome wives, both of whom needed to avoid pregnancy because of
serious potential health consequences for the wife.18 Trubek, by
contrast, involved a less traditional couple, both law students, who
wished to use contraception solely for family planning purposes.19
Thus, it appears that the two cases revolved around two dichotomies:
traditional versus egalitarian gender roles within marriage (gender
equality), and therapeutic versus non-therapeutic uses of
contraception (health).20 Poe involved contraception that was
medically necessary in a narrow sense, whereas Trubek involved
contraception that was necessary only for family and career planning
purposes. The fact that the litigation strategy proceeded on these two
14. Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE L.J.
FORUM 324 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/overlooking-equality-on-the-road-togriswold.
15. Id. at 324.
16. 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (“The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the
enforcement of this statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an
indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be umpire to debates
concerning harmless, empty shadows.”).
17. 367 U.S. 907 (1961). Three of the dissenters in Poe also dissented from the dismissal
of the appeal in Trubek because they were “of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be
noted.” Id.
18. Murray, supra note 14, at 325.
19. Id. (citing Louise G. Trubek, Op-Ed, The Unfinished Fight over Contraception, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/contraception-war-goeson.html).
20. Murray focuses on the fact that the Trubek case had the potential to bring the issue
gender equality before the Court, but that issue was ultimately submerged in the Griswold
litigation, in which the Court recognized a right to access contraception while invoking
traditional concepts of marriage and marital privacy. Murray, supra note 14, at 327–29.
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parallel paths suggests, then, that the therapeutic/non-therapeutic
distinction was present from the very beginnings of the judicial
recognition of constitutional reproductive rights.
Professor Mary Dudziak has also examined the history of early
birth control litigation in Connecticut, noting that, despite pleas from
litigants, the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to read an
exception into the state prohibition allowing contraception when the
woman’s life would be at risk from a pregnancy.21 The solution in
this situation, according to the court, was for the married couple in
question simply to refrain from sex.22 Thus, in suggesting that
pregnancy itself was always elective, in a sense, the Connecticut
court firmly placed reproductive health care outside of the framework
of necessary or therapeutic health care.23
The distinction plays out in contemporary political discourse as
well. In particular, the claims for religious and conscientious
exemptions from providing certain health care services—culminating
in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby24 litigation—tend to downplay the
significance of contraceptives to women’s health. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in that case took the majority to task for failing to
recognize the importance of contraceptives in the context of women’s
health care and for ignoring the harms to women arising from
religious exemptions.25
In fact, some religious doctrines distinguish between
contraceptives used for therapeutic and contraceptive purposes.26 An
21. Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court
Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 925 (1990) (discussing Tileston v.
Ullman, 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942), and State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940)).
22. Id. at 925–26.
23. Id. Ironically, as Dudziak notes, Connecticut’s abortion law did allow for abortions to
save the life of the woman, thus making its abortion law more liberal than its contraceptives
law. Id. at 926.
24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
25. Id. at 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining the significance of contraceptive
coverage to women’s health and economic and social equality and noting that the religious
exemption “would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to
contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure.”).
26. Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIS. 69,
103–04 (2004) (discussing the Catholic principle of “double effect”). The doctrine of double
effect refers to the Catholic belief that certain forbidden actions, such as abortion or euthanasia,
may be considered morally licit if they are done with the intention of achieving a permissible
goal. For example, Leonard J. Nelson, III gives the example of a surgical sterilization, which is
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Arizona law passed in 2012 (before Hobby Lobby) appeared to
embrace that distinction, allowing religious employers to refuse to
provide coverage for prescription contraception if it violated their
beliefs to do so, except if the drug was required for “medical
indications other than for contraceptive, abortifacient, abortion or
sterilization purposes.”27 Indeed, this distinction has permeated even
medical discourse to some extent. For example, Professor Farr
Curlin, who has written extensively (and supportively) about
conscientious objections to the provision of health care, refers to
reproductive health care services as “controversial clinical practices,”
and “legal yet controversial treatments,” seemingly distinguishing
them from other types of medical procedures and studiously avoiding
any implication of therapeutic benefit.28 Similarly, in an online article
for an ethics journal, Professor Curlin and his co-author Rev. Russell
Burck discuss a hypothetical example of a physician who is asked by
his young, unmarried, adult female patient to prescribe contraception.
The doctor’s choice whether to prescribe the drugs, according to
Curlin, “is a moral choice which implicitly or explicitly expresses a
moral judgment.”29
To summarize, the distinction between health care that is
“therapeutic” and reproductive health care—which is not—has
illict if performed to prevent future pregnancies but permissible if sterilization occurs in the
course of removing a diseased organ to cure the sterilized individual. Id. (citing CHARLES J.
MCFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 294–95 (3d ed. 1953)); see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 2271–74 (1994) (distinguishing between “direct abortion, that is to say, abortion
willed either as an end or a means” and actions such as prenatal diagnosis that are taken without
the intention of ending fetal or embryonic life but that may result in accidental termination of a
pregnancy); cf. id. at 2279 (stating, with respect to euthanasia, that “[t]he use of painkillers to
alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can be morally in
conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as either an end or a means, but only
foreseen and tolerated as inevitable”).
27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-826(Z) (2014) (West).
28. Farr A. Curlin, M.D., et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical
Practices, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 593, 593, 595, 597 (2007).
29. Farr A. Curlin, M.D. & Rev. Russell Burck, Ph.D., Clinical Case: Patient Counseling
and Matters of Conscience, VIRTUAL MENTOR: ETHICS JAMA 3 (May 2005) (Commentary 1
by Prof. Curlin), available at http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2005/05/pdf/ccas3-0505.pdf.
Later in the article, Curlin minimizes the focus on reproductive health services as uniquely
controversial, stating that “the pretense of neutrality cannot be sustained in any case where a
physician is asked to make a judgment, and such judgments are implicit in all deliberate human
actions, such as the decision to prescribe contraceptives, or, for that matter, to prescribe antihypertensives.” Id.
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permeated legal, political, and even to some degree medical discourse
since the use and legalization of contraception and abortion became
widespread. While this Article does not argue that the distinction has
always been firmly maintained in all contexts, it has been remarkably
salient and persistent. The next Part considers some of the
implications of this distinction for First Amendment issues that arise
in the reproductive health care context.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
I have argued elsewhere that, in recent First Amendment cases
arising in the reproductive health care context, many courts have
tended to view abortion and contraception (albeit not explicitly) as
something other than health care—primarily, as a moral or
ideological choice.30 This submerged understanding of reproductive
health care as “not really health care,” I argue, has often driven the
First Amendment analysis in ways that have gone largely unnoticed.
This Part summarizes and extends that argument.
In a series of recent cases, courts have considered the extent to
which the government can require entities known as Crisis Pregnancy
Centers (CPCs) to disclose the limited nature of their services and to
convey certain health-related messages.31 CPCs are generally nonprofit organizations that are often set up to look like medical clinics,
whose primary goal is to dissuade pregnant women from choosing
abortion.32 These entities may be religiously affiliated and may have
no licensed medical practitioners on-site, despite offering
ultrasounds, pregnancy testing, and counseling, along with some
forms of material and emotional support to pregnant women.33
30. B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59
(2015).
31. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Greater Balt.
Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013); O’Brien v. Mayor
of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds in Greater Balt.
Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d 264; Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740
F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014); A Woman's Friend Pregnancy Res.
Clinic v. Harris, No. 2:15-CV-02122-KJM-AC, 2015 WL 9274116 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015).
32. Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision
Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 936–37 (2013).
33. Id. at 936; New York, N.Y., Local Law 17 § 1 (Mar. 16, 2011) (findings) (stating that
CPCs in New York City have been found to deceive clients about “the availability of licensed
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Responding to documented incidents of deceptive conduct by
CPCs that sought to trick women into believing they were medical
establishments or abortion clinics (and in some instances trying to
prevent women from accessing abortion altogether) some
municipalities instituted disclosure requirements.34 In particular,
these municipalities required CPCs to make it known to clients that
they do not have a licensed medical professional on staff; that they do
not provide or refer for contraception or abortion; and/or that
government recommends that pregnant women see a licensed health
professional.35 Courts have generally applied heightened scrutiny to
these compelled speech requirements under the First Amendment, on
the theory that they require mention of “controversial services” and
are therefore “ideological.”36 Indeed, the Second Circuit in Evergreen
Ass’n v. City of New York suggested that abortion and contraception
were a matter of “public concern” and that the recommendation that
pregnant women should see licensed medical professionals is a
“public issue subject to dispute.”37
The framing of reproductive health care as a moral or ideological
choice and a matter of public concern rather than as private health
care is significant not just because it may shape the social meaning
and public understanding of contraception and abortion, but also
because this framing arguably affects the outcome in First
Amendment disputes. Particularly in the CPC cases, the non-profit
entities challenged the municipalities’ restrictions as compelled
ideological speech. In accepting the CPCs’ framing of the required
disclosures regarding the availability of certain services and medical
personnel as “ideological” in the reproductive health care context,
courts placed the case in a category that required heightened scrutiny
medical providers that provide or oversee services on-site”).
34. New York, N.Y., Local Law 17 § 1; Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 779 F. Supp. 2d
456, 459 (D. Md. 2011) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g
en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing
Montgomery County Res. No. 16–1252 (Feb. 2, 2010)).
35. See Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d 233; Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d 184; Greater Balt.
Ctr., 721 F.3d 264.
36. See infra note 38.
37. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 250 (“It may be the case that most, if not all, pregnancy
services centers would agree that pregnant women should see a doctor. That decision, however,
as this litigation demonstrates, is a public issue subject to dispute.”).
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according to First Amendment doctrine.38 If the required disclosures
had been viewed as dealing with primarily medical issues, the speech
likely would have been understood to constitute professional speech,
which receives a very low level of scrutiny (much like standard
medical informed consent requirements).39 Indeed, the required
disclosures could be seen as speech that is essentially aimed at
regulating a form of conduct that could constitute unlicensed practice
of medicine, since CPCs sometimes intentionally adopt the
appearance of medical clinics and offer diagnostic and related
medical services.40
By contrast, in cases dealing with ideologically-charged informed
consent requirements for abortion, courts’ framing of abortion as a
moral or ideological choice rather than as health care leads them to
uphold these forced disclosures under the First Amendment. This
seemingly counter-intuitive result arises from the fact that the
framing of abortion as a moral or ideological choice leads courts to
38. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 245 (holding that the challenged speech is subject to
either strict or intermediate scrutiny); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d
456, 468 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g
en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013). Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court’s application of strict scrutiny in Centro Tepeyac but emphasized that the district court
agreed the speech was non-commercial and non-professional because “it could not determine
otherwise on the undeveloped record before it.” Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 189 (emphasis
added). But see A Woman's Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, No. 2:15-CV-02122-KJMAC, 2015 WL 9274116, at *19-23 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) (holding that CPC speech should
be categorized as professional speech and therefore that CPC disclosure requirements are
subject either to intermediate scrutiny or to a “reasonableness” test).
39. See generally Hill, supra note 30, at 60–62 (explaining that the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the category of professional speech in its First Amendment jurisprudence but
that rational basis review is generally applied to speech restrictions in the professional-speech
context); see also A Woman's Friend, 2015 WL 9274116, at *19-23 (applying a lower level of
scrutiny to a law requiring certain disclosures for CPCs after identifying CPC speech as
professional speech and identifying the relevant government interest as “ensur[ing] that
California residents know their rights and the health care resources available to them when they
make their personal reproductive health care decisions”) (emphasis added).
40. Jennifer Keighley offers the analogy of a “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments Options
Center” that looks like a clinic but does not employ licensed medical professionals and counsels
against blood transfusions (based on religious belief). Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle
the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
539, 604 (2012); see generally Kirsten Gallacher, Protecting Women from Deception: The
Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements in Pregnancy Centers, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
113, 125 (2011) (“Some pregnancy centers . . . locate near abortion or medical clinics and try to
look like them.”).
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view a wider range of propositions—not just medical facts, but also
metaphysical or ideological statements—as relevant to the abortion
decision. For example, the State of South Dakota requires physicians
to inform women seeking abortions that they are about to terminate
the life of “a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”41 In
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, the Eighth Circuit considered
whether that required disclosure violated physicians’ First
Amendment rights.42 To answer that question, the court looked to
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which briefly stated that informed
consent requirements are constitutionally acceptable if they are
relevant, truthful, and non-misleading.43 Because it framed abortion
as moral rather than medical, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
disclosures in Rounds, finding that informed consent requirements
that extend beyond an explanation of the “medical risks” of the
procedure were nonetheless “relevant,” because “abortion requires a
difficult and painful moral decision.”44 In this way, the court
suggested that abortion is different from other medical procedures, in
which the informed consent process is limited to medical risks,
benefits, and alternatives.45
Thus, in cases like Rounds, courts rely on the medical aspects of
abortion to frame abortion informed-consent requirements as
compelled professional speech, which, according to Casey, is subject
to a much lower level of scrutiny than compelled ideological speech.
But then, by also framing abortion as predominantly (or at least
substantially) a moral decision rather than a medical one, courts
expand the concept of “relevance” beyond its traditional boundaries
in the informed-consent context. In this way, government-mandated
statements about the transcendental nature of the fetus or embryo can
be justified as relevant to the medical decision.
41. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008)).
42. Id. at 724.
43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality op.).
44. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007))
(emphasis added).
45. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less
Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31–32 (2011).
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Unfortunately, this manipulation of the notion of relevance
conflicts with the justifications for subjecting compelled professional
speech like informed consent to a lower standard of scrutiny. In
particular, the idea that the government should have some leeway to
require disclosures in the informed-consent context derives in large
part from the notion that professionals such as physicians have
superior knowledge and therefore superior power over the patient that
requires special protection of the patient.46 Once the informedconsent requirements no longer relate to medical issues within the
physician’s domain of expertise, however, this patient-protection
rationale fades away.47
Interestingly, some of the earliest cases extending First
Amendment protection to commercial speech also dealt with
reproductive health care. In those cases, too, the understanding of
reproductive health care as not being primarily medical influenced
the doctrinal framework that was applied to the free-speech claims.
For example, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a ban on mailing unsolicited
advertisements for condoms.48 Although some of the brochures
contained factual discussions of sexually transmitted infections,
others were simply advertisements.49 Treating all of these items the
same for First Amendment purposes, the Court noted that the flyers
“contain[ed] discussions of important public issues” and struck down
the ban.50 Thus, the framing of reproductive health care as having a
non-medical, political dimension arguably contributed to the
protection of speech about reproductive health care. A similar
analysis affected the Court’s approach in another early case, Bigelow
v. Virginia, in which the Court found that an advertisement for
46. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229–32 (1985); see generally Daniel
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 47 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999).
47. Sawicki, supra note 45, at 32.
48. 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 67.
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abortion services was protected commercial speech.51 In so holding,
the Court noted that the advertisement discussed issues of “clear
‘public interest,’” such as the legal status of abortion in New York,
which was “not unnewsworthy.”52 By contrast, the Virginia Supreme
Court had upheld the newspaper’s conviction for violating Virginia’s
law against advertising abortion services, on the ground that the law
pertained to medical care and was clearly within the state’s police
power to pass.53 Placing abortion in a broader political context
allowed the Supreme Court to afford expansive protection to the
advertisement, whereas pure commercial speech would likely have
received a lower level of protection.
In a different area of the First Amendment—abortion protests—
the framing of reproductive health care could also be seen as
affecting the approach to the free-speech questions. In the recent case
of McCullen v. Coakley, Justice Scalia sparred with counsel over
whether to refer to picketers outside an abortion clinic as “protestors”
or “counselors.”54 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the
51. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The advertisement, which was published in 1971, stated:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN’S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make
all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling.
Id. at 812.
52. Id. at 823.
53. Bigelow v. Comm’r, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Va. 1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 909 (1973).
54. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, 43, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014)
(No. 12-1168) (“I — I object to you calling these people protestors, which you’ve been doing
here during the whole presentation. That is not how they present themselves. They do not say
they want to make protests. They say they want to talk quietly to the women who are going into
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majority insisted that the picketers were engaged in “counseling” and
were “not protestors.”55 By rejecting the “protestor” label in favor of
the “counseling” label, the majority analogized the activity to what
takes place in an intimate (mental or physical) health-care setting.56
This framing of the picketers’ activity is part of what led the Court to
see the buffer zone surrounding the clinic as overbroad and
insufficiently tailored, since it was aimed at limiting loud, intrusive
protests.57 At the same time, however, the notion that women ought
to be open to “counseling” and quiet suggestion from complete
strangers on the street is somewhat incongruous with an
understanding of the abortion decision as private. Perhaps Justices
Scalia and Roberts could see this notion as unexceptional only
because they understood the woman’s abortion decision as somehow
of interest and relevance to other people, or to the public at large—
not, in other words, as fundamentally private.
Finally, though it is not a First Amendment case, the majority’s
opinion Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, dealing with protection of religious
freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
arguably minimizes the therapeutic aspects of contraception in
foregrounding the individual claims of conscience.58 In the majority’s
consideration of whether the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
coverage mandate violates the rights of certain religious employers,
the health dimension of contraception is almost entirely lost. Indeed,
by simply “assuming” the Government’s interest “in guaranteeing
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods,”59
without even mentioning the word “health,” the majority minimized
these facilities. Now how does that make them protestors?”); Id. at 24 (referring to “abortion
counselors”).
55. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2527, 2536 (2014).
56. Id. at 2536 (“Petitioners are not protestors. They seek not merely to express their
opposition to abortion, but to inform women of various alternatives and to provide help in
pursuing them. Petitioners believe that they can accomplish this objective only through
personal, caring, consensual conversations.”).
57. Id. at 2535–37.
58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
59. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; cf. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling
Interests and Contraception, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2015) (noting the ways in which
the majority’s opinion and the Government’s brief were both “incomplete” in their descriptions
of the interests at stake in Hobby Lobby).
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the public-health and individual health benefits of contraceptives
coverage; the women affected by the decision are nearly invisible. 60
Ultimately, the characterization of reproductive health care as
something other than health care can cut either way. It can lead to
greater protection for reproductive-health related speech; it can also
protect speech intended to mislead women who may wish to seek an
abortion. Either way, unacknowledged assumptions about the place
of reproductive health care within health care more generally often
drives the doctrinal First Amendment analysis.
III. IS ALL REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE “THERAPEUTIC”?
This Article concludes with some reflections on whether
reproductive health care—particularly abortion and contraception—
can and should be understood as “essential” or “therapeutic” health
care. Feminists and reproductive rights advocates have long rejected
the notion that there is such a thing as “non-therapeutic” reproductive
health care,61 but this idea has not been sufficiently developed in the
legal literature. Indeed, even within this distinction, the definition of
“therapeutic” has been remarkably fuzzy.62
In the vast majority of cases, contraception and abortion are used
for purposes of “family planning,” rather than to avoid physical
ailments or injury.63 But the concept of family planning—itself rather
60. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, by contrast, partially supplied this missing rationale.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, with the
contraceptive coverage requirement, “Congress left health care decisions—including the choice
among contraceptive methods—in the hands of women, with the aid of their health care
providers”).
61. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Health Care Reform and Abortion, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 58, 76 n.46 (1994); Suzanna Sherry, Women’s Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1591, 1598 n.6
(1989); cf. Lance Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957,
982 (2010) (describing the “right to health” model for protecting reproductive health rights
under international law).
62. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications
of Defining “Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care
Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445, 459 (2012) (discussing the Hyde Amendment debates); Sherry,
supra note 61, at 1598 n.6 (discussing the incoherence of considering abortions for pregnancies
resulting from rape or incest to be “therapeutic” while not taking seriously the mental health
costs of carrying other unwanted pregnancies to term).
63. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and
Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005).
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amorphous—does not fit obviously or easily into most
understandings of health care or medical treatments, which often
center on avoidance or treatment of disease.64 Indeed, pregnancy,
which seems eminently “natural,” can be a healthy, wanted state. It is
unlike many other physical conditions in that the identical condition
may be perfectly desirable and thus “healthy” or, in a sense,
pathological, depending on the subjective desires of the individual
woman.
At same time, it seems relevant that pregnancy itself is a state for
which medical attention is generally sought (the Second Circuit’s
skepticism about that proposition in Evergreen notwithstanding).65
Moreover, even in common usage “therapeutic” treatments are not
just those that heal the patient or rid her of “disease.” They also
include those that rid the individual of unwanted, undesirable health
conditions and health risks, as well as negative social and emotional
effects.66 Medical treatments to correct a disfiguring deformity, such
as breast implants after a mastectomy, are one example of therapeutic
and widely accepted health care that corrects primarily for negative
social and emotional effects. According to this wider understanding
of necessary health care, unwanted pregnancy is not just a social
emergency for the individual—it is an undesirable medical state.
Indeed, pregnancy certainly includes physical risks and sometimes
illness, at least temporarily, and it is a physical state that can reduce
normal functioning in some respects. As one court has put it,
avoiding unwanted pregnancy allows woman to “prevent a litany of
physical, emotional, economic, and social consequences.”67
Unintended pregnancies and births are associated with a wide range
64. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling “Medical
Necessity”, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 435, 440 (2015) (citing, among other things, the
American Medical Association description of “a ‘prudent’ physician’s provision of medical
care [as being] aimed at ‘preventing, diagnosing[,] or treating an illness, injury, disease or its
symptoms.’”).
65. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 435 (2014).
66. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449,
1468 (1994) (discussing Professor Norman Daniels’s theory that necessary health care is health
care aimed at providing a “normal opportunity range” to individuals).
67. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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of physical and mental health problems for the mother and the
child.68
Nonetheless, it remains difficult for many people to recognize that
an abortion of an unwanted pregnancy that occurs simply because the
pregnancy is unplanned constitutes a “therapeutic” abortion. Indeed,
emphasizing the physical and mental health risks of pregnancy may
operate to rhetorically re-inscribe the distinction between the
therapeutic and the non-therapeutic. The narrowly medical account of
the risks of unintended pregnancy feels incomplete and not quite
right; something more is needed to demonstrate that all reproductive
health care wanted and needed by a woman is, in fact, necessary
health care.
That “something more” may be the equality framework for
reproductive rights. The notion that the need to avoid or end a
pregnancy for career and family planning reasons makes it just as
therapeutic as avoiding it for more narrowly physical, medical
reasons only makes sense in light of a perspective that recognizes
equality of opportunity and autonomy over one’s life path as an
aspect of full human flourishing. It is only by rejecting pregnancy as
natural, as part of the inevitable duty and destiny of all women, and
therefore in all circumstances a positive good (or at least by refusing
to see forced childbearing as a relatively minor harm, as being not as
bad as going through life with a deformity, for example), that we can
see how avoiding or ending unwanted pregnancy is inherently
“therapeutic.”69
Indeed, the equality framework sheds light on another area in
which courts have drawn a distinction between “therapeutic” and
“non-therapeutic” reproductive health care—namely, in the
availability of condoms to prevent the spread of disease. As
Professors Neil S. Siegel and Reva B. Siegel explain, the nineteenth68. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73
WASH. L. REV. 363, 365 & n.8 (1998); ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: UNINTENDED
PREGNANCY IN THE U.S. (July 2015), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FBUnintended-Pregnancy-US.html.
69. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 291–92 (1992)
(discussing nineteenth-century views of pregnancy as natural and an inherent part of women’s
destiny).
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and early twentieth-century history of enforcing bans on
contraception was a highly gendered one.70 Yet the gendered nature
of the enforcement was also tied to the understanding of various
forms of birth control as therapeutic or non-therapeutic. In the
twentieth century, Connecticut and Massachusetts—states that
outlawed contraception in most instances—made explicit exceptions
for the use of condoms to prevent sexually transmitted diseases.71
Thus, protection against disease, which was possible through a form
of birth control used only by men, was a therapeutic purpose;
avoidance of unwanted pregnancy, which could be achieved through
forms of birth control available to women, was not. Indeed, even
avoidance of dangerous pregnancies was not seen as medically
necessary in the same way as avoidance of venereal disease; courts
refused to read exceptions into the states’ birth control statutes even
for women who would suffer substantial health risks from
pregnancy.72 They, unlike men, were advised simply to abstain from
sex.73
This example from the early state regulation of birth control
demonstrates how gender has played into traditional concepts of what
is therapeutic and what is not. In the first half of the twentieth
century, states like Massachusetts and Connecticut treated the use of
a prophylactic, which does not even require a physician’s prescription
or recommendation, as a medically necessary form of health care,
whereas use of birth control pills to avoid pregnancy was not.74 As a
consequence, women and men have different degrees of control over
their reproductive lives. Men are able to avoid unwanted diseases and
pregnancy, but unwanted pregnancy for women is not even conceived
as medically cognizable harm. As Siegel and Siegel explain, this
70. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE
L.J. F. 349, 351–52 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sexequality-right.
71. Id. at 352–53.
72. Id. at 352.
73. Id. at 352 & n.24.
74. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 8 (1940)). Relatedly, the
Connecticut Supreme Court delineated a distinction between contraception for the “‘general
health’ of the patient,” and contraception to alleviate “a specific disease or condition,” although
it ultimately held that both uses of contraception were forbidden. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn.
84, 86, 26 A.2d 582, 584 (1942) (citing State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (1940)).
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“disparate treatment” both “reflected and reinforced traditional
gender roles in sex and parenting.”75
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the equality
framework also has the potential to undermine the view of
reproductive health care as therapeutic. It is arguably the
politicization of reproductive health care as an aspect of women’s
equality that has led to the construction of abortion and contraception
as political rather than personal and medical.76 If access to
reproductive health care is intimately tied to women’s political,
social, and economic equality, then reproductive health care itself is
more easily framed as a political or ideological choice. As
demonstrated above in Part II, the political construction of
reproductive health care has persisted, shaping courts’ doctrinal
approaches in First Amendment cases dealing with reproductive
health care, both for better and for worse. The equality framework is
also incomplete without the therapeutic health-care framework.
CONCLUSION
Though reproductive health care undoubtedly possesses moral and
even spiritual dimensions that may differentiate it from some other
forms of health care, the tendency to view reproductive health as
inherently and primarily political has shaped the legal approach to
contraception and abortion. Both recent and more venerable First
Amendment cases arising in the reproductive health context reflect an
underlying tension between framing reproductive health care as
simply health care and framing it as primarily something else.
In some cases, constructing reproductive health care as political
has led to greater protection for speech related to abortion and
contraception; in other instances, it has allowed legislatures to require
doctors to promote ideological state messages and has prevented
them from enforcing measures intended to protect pregnant women
seeking access to unbiased information regarding their options.
75. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 70, at 355.
76. See generally Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade:
New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052 (2011) (discussing the politicization
of abortion in the 1970s and its association with the feminist movement).
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Whether this understanding of reproductive health care is helpful or
harmful in the First Amendment context, it is important to recognize
that it often drives the legal analysis. Moreover, it is useful to
recognize that these First Amendment cases, by validating the view
of reproductive health care as non-medical, reinforce the distinction
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic reproductive health care.
If all reproductive health care were seen as therapeutic and
necessary, several positive consequences would follow. First, it
would mean that reproductive health care is taken seriously as a
government interest and an individual need; it might weigh more
heavily against companies’ claims to religious exemptions, for
example. Second, it would be more difficult to engage in differential
regulation of abortion and contraception if they were viewed as forms
of medically necessary care. Broad conscience-based exemptions to
provision of reproductive health care services would be harder to
justify, as would so-called TRAP laws. Abortion and contraception
could not be so easily isolated from other forms of health care, in
statutory law or in constitutional doctrine.
Ultimately, to arrive at this result, a new rhetorical framework is
required—one that merges both equality and health. As demonstrated
in Part III, the medical framework for reproductive health care is
incomplete unless it builds upon an assumption that women are
entitled to equality of opportunity and control over their futures. Yet,
the equality framework, which sees access to abortion and
contraception as essential to women’s political and social equality, is
incomplete without an understanding of abortion and contraception as
fundamentally private medical matters rather than political and
ideological choices.
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